U.S. Policy Interests in Trade Between Eastern European and Common Market Counties. SEVENTH SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY. 11 June 1965 by Mintzes, Joseph
~ 
I 
.. ,; 
SEVE..~ SENIOR SEMINAR IN l!'OREIGN PJLICf 
~....!.Q..l,icy lQ.t~r:.~st§._~rade 
Be ~~~.Il~S tern !,_u:ro'Q~ci!l 
Alld 
.£.Qmm2.n J!s.rke t Col,!!!tti,.~ 
by 
Joseph Mintzes 
June 11> 1965 
I 
\J 
I, 
THIS STUDY DOES NJT C()NSTITUTE A STATEM&NT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY 
Foreign Service Institute 
Dapartm,ant of State 
(\.1,: 
\.' 
,, 
\_ -. 
\ \. 
;. 
.. 
1' 
• 
.. ti • \. 
•••••..:•••••• 
/ 
An analysis of the impact of the Common 'Market on Eastern 
Europe, current trends in relation.s between the two groups of 
countries and related United States p·.Jlicy intereats. 
In addition to prior interviews with authorities in the 
United States, the collection of bgckgroun::l an::l materials for 
this report involved travel by the author in .April-May 1965 
to Prague, Bu,:::harest, Budapest, Br..1ss.els, Geneva and Paris • 
•••••••••••• 
. , ..... 
TABLE OF CONTSNIS 
Page 
Preface••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 
Chapter I -- Sumnary•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
Chapter II -- Problems and Policy Objectives•••••••••••••••••• 9 
Chapter III -- Background and Analysis •••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 
A. Relations Between Eastern Europeaa and Common 
Market Countri~s••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 
1. Eastern European. Attitudes Toward the Com.non 
Market•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 
a. Relevant Political Trends in Eastern 
Europe••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 
b. Ideology versus Reality •••••••••••••••••••• 13 
c. CEMA and the Common ~rket ••••••••••••••••• 18 
2. Common M~rket Policy Toward the Eastern 
European. Countries•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 22 
B. Trade Between Eastern European and EEC Countries ••••• 26 
1. Levels, Composition.and Relative Importance •••••• 26 
2. Factors Affecting Trade Between the Two Groups •• 28 
a. Institutional Framework•••••••••••••••••••• 28 
b. Prices, Costs and Recent Reforms ••••••••••• 31 
c. Role of Other International Institutions: GA.II, 
O.ECD, etc••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 36 
Chapter IV -- Conclusions and Recomm2ndations ••••••••••••••••• 42 
References •••• ~••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 50 
Selected Bibliograp~Y••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 52 
Biographical Note••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 54 

.. 
PREFACE 
Relations between Eastern European and Comm.on Market countries* 
are examined in this paper in light of broad United States policy 
objectives of furthering economic integration in Western Europe, 
of encouraging the Eastern European countries to renew traditional 
contacts with their Western neighbors and to reduce their reliance 
on the Soviet Union. A number of suggestions are made for policy 
guidance in the coming few years when the Common Market will be 
moving through its final transitional phase. During this pzriod, 
the EEC is expected to develop a com:non com11ercial policy toward 
state-trading countries of Eastern Europe. 
The study was also undertaken in light of growing polycentrist 
and nationalist tendencies within the Communist World and a related 
thaw in East-West relations that stimulated interest in trade and 
other contacts between Eastern European and EEC countries. Assuming 
that the international political and economic climate does not 
worsen, the period ahead should provide an excellent opportunity 
for normalizing relations between the two groups of countries. 
*As a rough indication of the relative size and economic 
importance of the two groups of countries, the population of 
Eastern Eur·ope (excluding the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Albania) 
amounts to 100 million persons compared with approximately 180 
million in. the EEC countries; comparable gross national product 
estimates for 1963 were roughly 100 billion and 250 billion dollars, 
respectively. 
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Hopefully, this could be the basis for taking steps to resolve 
major divisive issues which have plagued Europe since and even 
before World War II. 
Factors which affect trade between the state-trading countries 
of Eastern Europe and the market economies of Western Europe are 
also assessed. In addition, the paper examines the related impact 
of trade and other contacts on Eastern European economic practices 
and institutions. 
While the study is necessarily focussed on Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania and Hungary, references to significant developments else-
where in Eastern Europe have been included. The three countries 
were selected in light of varying backgrounds which affect their 
interest in expanding trade with the West and, in particular, with 
the EEC countries. All three are seeking to modernize their 
economies from different levels of development. Rumania is in the 
less developed category;while Czechoslovakia is an industrially 
advanced country; and Hungarian economic development is roughly 
between the two. Czechoslovakia has recently embarked on important 
economic reforms; Rumania has displayed little or no motion in this 
sphere; and Hungary again falls between the two. Only Rumania among 
the three is consciously seeking to reduce its reliance on the Soviet 
Union by shifting some of its trade to the West. Hopefully, the 
variety of experience reflected by the three countries should help 
to make the study broadly representative of Eastern Europe. 
• 
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Chapter I 
Summary 
Relations between the Common Market and Eastern European 
countries are at a turning point as the EEC moves through the 
final years of its transitional period. A common commercial 
policy vis-a-vis the state-trading Eastern European countries 
remains elusive in the continued absence of an agreed EEC foreign 
policy. In recent years, Eastern European regimes have veered 
away from rigid ideological concepts about the Com.~on Market to 
a more realistic approach. This change has been induced by the 
sustained economic expansion of the Six and by the interest of 
the Eastern European countries to increase trade and other 
traditional contacts with neighboring EEC countries. Polycentrism 
and renewed nationalism have stimulated this interest as well as 
a strong desire of Eastern Europe to modernize its economy with 
considerable reliance on Western technology. 
Although the Eastern European countries have not recognized 
the legality of the Common Market as a customs union, informal 
"technical" contacts have been established, notably in the case 
of Poland which recently concluded negotiations with the Commission 
in regard to egg imports.J Fea'r' of the impact of the Common Market 
...._ _____ .... ------ .. ------·-··----·--· 
has cautiously receded in most Eastern European countries where 
foreign trade officials are pragmatically examining alternative 
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trade possibilities with a greater degree of confidence than a 
1:/ 
: few years ago. Overall trade levels with the EEC countries have 
/ risen in recent years, but there has been some reduction in EEC 
1, 
't 
:\ imports of agricultural products such as eggs and poultry. Trade 
relations between the two groups of countries is influenced by 
the Eastern European priority concern of earning foreign exchange 
for needed imports contras.ted with the emphasis of EEC countries 
in search of markets for their exports. 
Significant shifts away from the present degree of reliance 
on the Soviet Union as the principal trading partner are not 
expected in any of the Eastern European countries except Rumania. 
However, Soviet initiated efforts of a few years ago to transform 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) into an integrated 
Eastern European e·conomic unit have failed as a result of the strong 
opposition of Rumania and to a lesser extent of Bulgaria to proposals 
which would have slowed down their economic development. Continued 
divergent interests of member countries make it unlikely that CEMA 
could serve at this time as the spokesman for Eastern Europe in 
relations with the EEC or other Western-oriented economic insti-
tutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Trade between EEC and Eastern European countries is likely to 
continue to be governed by bilateral trade agreements a pattern 
which serves the immediate but differing national interests of France 
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and the German Federal Republic, the two largest Common Market 
countries. No significant steps are likely to be taken by the 
Commission in regard to commercial policy toward Eastern Europe 
at least until the key elections of 1965 in France and Germany 
are past. The Commission seems to be leaning toward EEC bilateral 
trade agreements and related Community-wide quota restrictions to 
replace individual EEC country bilaterals with the various Eastern 
European countries. A possible move toward multilateral trading 
would depend on evolving relations between various Eastern European 
countries and the GATT. The outcome of the current Kennedy Round 
of tariff negotiations, in which a few Eastern European countries 
are.participating, will be of much significance in regard to these 
-relations. 
> 
EEC countries provide an important complementary trading area 
for Eastern Europe which exports mainly agricultural, primary and 
semi-finished products in return for much needed machinery and 
/ capital 
L..western 
equipment. Interest in increasing trade with EEC and other 
European countries has helped to stimulate some economic 
reforms and changes in the trading structure of Eastern Europe. 
These reforms, although not·altering significantly the basic 
centralized economic planning structure, contribute to important 
liberalizing trends in Eastern Europe that meet general Western 
objectives. Trade and other contacts also facilitate another 
important objective, shared by the u.s., of normalizing relations 
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between the two groups of countries. Expansion of trade between 
the EEC and Eastern European countries can progressively reduce 
the reliance now placed on trade with the Soviet Union by the 
latter. From a broad U.S. policy point of view, the positive 
impact of this trade on the Eastern European countries and the 
levels involved could be maximized were present bllateral agreements 
replaced by multilateral trading arrangements under an EEC common 
commercial policy vis-a-vis the state-trading countries. 
Thought-provoking concern has been voiced by outstanding 
authorities on Eastern Europe regarding the danger of possible 
disintegration and Balkanization of Eastern Europe as nationalist 
tendencies there become more virulent. The Common Market, the rest 
of Western Europe and the u.s. should develop common policies 
responsive to this danger. 
On the basis of these observations and conclusions, the 
following recommendations are made asruggested policy guidelines 
for the critically important four to five years remaining in the 
Common Market's transitional period: 
1. A normalization of relations away from the Cold War 
pattern should be sought as an immediate objective 
in trade and other contacts between the EEC and 
Eastern European countries. 
2. Expansion of trade opportunities for Eastern European 
countries in EEC and other Western European countries 
1 
should be encouraged so as to reduce progressively the 
degree of reliance on trade with the Soviet Union. 
3. Preferably, trade relations between the two groups of 
countries should be encouraged to move toward a multi-
lateral basis from the present pattern of bilateral 
agreements and quota restrictions with the view to 
facilitating trade expansion and the liberalization 
of trade and related economic institutions within . 
Eastern Europe. 
4. Sympathetic consideration should be given to Eastern 
European offers in the current Kennedy Round of tariff 
negotiations in GATT. Experimentally, an annual review 
technique or other device might be employed to examine 
trade policies of Eastern European countries for compliance 
with GATT principles. Ultimate accession of these 
countries to GATT should be encouraged, if the foregoing 
is successful. 
5. Eastern European countries should be encouraged to 
recognize the Common Market and establish missions to 
the EEC in Brussels. 
6. The United States should support possible Eastern European 
efforts to enlarge trade opportunities with the EEC, 
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particularly when these efforts would lead to multilateral 
trading arrangements. 
7. In its efforts to encourage the EEC to open its doors 
to Eastern European countries and to develop an outward-
looking trade policy, the United States should stress the 
potential importance of the Common Market in reducing 
divisive tendencies among Eastern European countries 
that could negatively affect the stability of all of Europe. 
8. The United States should discourage the EEC from developing 
trade policies toward the Eastern European countries which 
could result in retaliation through CEMA or otherwise 
strengthen bonds with the Soviet Union. 
9. In addition to GATT, cited above, existing organizations 
for broader economic consultation should be tried or, if 
necessary, new ones developed in order to facilitate 
further contacts between Eastern and Western European 
countries. (Xhe OECD, the IMF and the IBRD are suggested 
as possibilities. Possibly a special liaison group of 
the OECD might review consultative machinery w~th 
representatives of Eastern European countries.) 
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Chapter II 
Problems and Policy Objectives 
By December 31, 1969, the terminal date of the transitional 
period, the Rome Treaty envisages the development of an EEC common 
commercial policy toward the state-trading countries of Eastern 
Europe. How this policy develops could determine whether the 
Common Market will become an economic and political pole of 
attraction for Eastern European countries. The latter have 
displayed increasing interest in expanding trade and other 
traditional contacts with neighboring countries now in the EEC. 
Future trade patterns between the EEC and the Eastern European 
countries and the Community's impact on the latter will be strongly 
influenced by the EEC's decision as to whether such trade should 
continue to be channelled through bilateral agreements with related 
quota restrictions or whether this commerce should move toward a 
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis. As in its relations with 
the rest of the world, whether the EEC's general trading policy is 
outward-looking or not will have a significant bearing on its 
impact in Eastern Europe. The EEC policy could help these countries 
renew traditional ties with Western Europe or alternatively oblige 
them defensively to continue to rely on the Soviets. 
Depending on policies pursued in the next few years, the 
persistant political problems which have been plaguing Europe 
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since and even before World War II could be approached constructively 
on a broad European basis or might deteriorate into open conflict. 
The evolution of these relations will reflect widely varying 
national interests among countries in Eastern Europe and in the 
Common Market. 
The following policy objectives in Europe, that serve as 
' the framework for this study, have a close bearing on these issues: 
1. a normalization of relations between Eastern and EEC 
and other Western European countries; 
2. the related resolution of traditional European rivalries 
and the avoidance of a renewed Balkanization of Europe 
with inherent dangers of instability and conflict; 
3. the development of an outward-looking Common Market 
which could fulfill the political as well as economic 
goals of integration; 
4. a reduction of dependence of Eastern European countries 
on the Soviet Union; and 
s. a progressive liberalization and humanization of Eastern 
European economic and political institutions. 
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Chapter III 
Background and Analysis 
A. Relations Between Eastern European and Common Market Countries 
1. Eastern European Attitudes Toward the Common Market 
a. Relevant Political Trends in Eastern Europe 
Polycentrism, a revival of nationalism and the detente 
in Soviet-Western relations have been the main political factors 
behind the interest in Eastern Europe to expand trade and other 
contacts with EEC members and other Western European countries. 
Since the shock of the 1956 revolt in Hungary, Communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe, with Soviet benevolent approval, have had some 
success in building a more popular base. Progress has been evident 
in the improvement in consumer availabilities, in a degree of 
humanization and liberalization of the regimes, and a relaxation 
toward Western contacts. With the intensification of Sino-Soviet 
differences in recent years, the Soviets have been obliged to reduce 
the degree of discipline they had previously exerted over the Eastern 
European regimes. This looser association may be preferred by the 
Soviets who probably want to avoid being overly committed to their 
Eastern European associates. An Eastern European authority, Richard 
Lowenthal, drew an interesting analogy with French disengagement 
from Algeria which gave it much greater diplomatic flexibility.1/ 
12 • 
.Nationalist tendencies are most evident in Rumania where 
the regime has actively exploited the opportunity provided by 
Sino-Soviet differences to reduce its economic reliance on the 
Soviet Union. However, in a less active form, nationalist overtones 
have been present in recent years in all Eastern European countries. 
Renewed nationalism was a major factor in CEMA's failure in 1963 to 
launch an economic integration program. The CEMA effort, discussed 
below, foundered mainly over Rumanian and to some extent Bulgarian 
refusal to accept a subordinate less-developed country status. 
Authorities on Eastern Europe such as Brzezinski, Montias and 
Shulman deplore the potentially negative impact of nationalistic 
tendencies which carry the disruptive danger of Balkanization. 
Eastern European countries had only sporadic experience with the 
dignity of independent statehood or achieved this status relatively 
recently as contrasted with Western European countries. Therefore, 
the former reflect a relatively more virulent form of nationalism.1,/ 
This potential instability might be further stimulated by restiveness 
among Eastern European ethnic minorities which could conceivably again 
seek the dubious goal of separate statehood. 
Against this background stands the post-World War II 
problem of a divided Germany. Neighboring Eastern European countries 
have been fearful of the political and economic potential of a 
unified Germany. The Soviets have exploited this fear, also shared 
in some Western European countries, by pointing to the enviable 
economic expansion in Western Germany, its likely dominant role in 
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the Common Market, and to the possibility of nuclear arms in 
German hands. This frictional issue, as described recently by 
Brzezinski, has been stabilized for the time being as an un-
expected outcome of the Berlin wall.]/ The resultant breathing 
spell could provide the opportunity for constructive steps in 
both Eastern and Western Europe which could facilitate a s'olution, 
with the Common Market in a position to play an important role. 
b. Ideology versus Reality 
The concept of European economic integration has been 
troublesome to Communist theorists since it has not fulfilled 
their dire predictions about capitalism. The Western European 
countries,under the "contradictions of monopoly capitali~m", were 
expected to divide on the basis of conflicting national interests 
rather than.move toward an international economic association. 
Soviet expectations of an early collapse of the Common Market gave 
way to more guarded observations as the integration time schedule 
of the Common Market was maintained and accompanied by enviable 
economic growth records. Communist doctrinal infallibility was 
awkwardly stretched to meet these unexpected developments and, in 
most of Eastern Europe, it seems to be giving way to pragmatism. 
Prior to the Treaty of Rome of 1957, Soviet spokesmen 
viewed early economic integration efforts essentially as an American 
plot to dominate Europe. This was part of a general categorization 
which the Soviets also applied to the American-aided European 
Recovery Program and to NATO. During the period from its inception 
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in 1958 until the United Kingdom's bid for entry into the EEC 
in July 1961, this theme occasionally appeared in the Cormnunist 
press which, however, usually paid little attention to the 
Common Market. 
Markedly stepped up interest in the EEC was evident in 
Communist circles in the ensuing period. Propaganda was directed 
against the Common Market as an instrument of NATO and monopoly 
capitalism also being employed in a neo-colonialist manner against 
the emerging countries. Diplomatic pressure was directed at Britain 
and other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
which were applying for or considering EEC membership. By June 1962, 
the growing concern in the Communist camp was reflected in the 
calling of an emergency meeting of CEMA to consider possible steps 
which could meet the impact of a broader EEC. 
Two items appearing in the Soviet press in the summer of 
1962 provided a new and authoritative analysis of the Common Market 
for the Communist world.if One article was published in ~ravda 
(August 26, 1962) on the eve of an international Moscow meeting of 
Marxist economists who discussed "the problems of contemporary modern 
capitalism". The other article was published under Premier 
Krushchev's name shortly after this meeting. Both articles recognized 
the economic and political reality of the Common Market. There was 
an implication that the Soviet Union was ready to take the Common 
Market into account within the broad concept of peaceful coexistence 
\. ... 
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with the capitalist world. Although the Soviet authors maintained 
that capitalist contradictions eventually would lead to the failure 
of the EEC, they admitted some immediate positive results from 
economic integration. The faithful were comforted by the observation 
that since the commercial discrimination practiced by the EEC against 
the Socialist states "contradict the objective laws of world economic 
relations, they••• are built on sand".j./ 
The August 1962 International Moscow Conference, cited 
above, reflected significant differences among Communist parties 
in regard to the Soviet analysis and proposed tactics toward the 
Common Market. Representatives of the Italian Communist Party 
viewed the Common Market as a vital economic institution that had 
benefited workers. The Italian party urged Communists to work 
within the EEC to assure••• "the democratization of the supranational 
institutions."*6/ The Italian Communists in varying degrees received 
- . 
support from their Belgian, Polish, Yugoslav and Czech colleagues. In 
response to the apparent appeal of the position of this group, the 
chief Soviet representative, Anerchevank Arzumanjan, concluded that 
the Common Market was a viable economic union, but that it was not 
a response to all the problems of capitalism. He pointed to 
technological and scientific advances which were renewing fixed 
*The Communist-led Italian Confederation of Labor (CGIL) took 
a similar position in the December 1962 meeting in Leipzig of the 
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). It opened a liaison bureau 
in Brussels to maintain contact with the EEC after unsuccessful 
efforts to have such an office established by the WFTU which has 
Soviet-oriented leadership. 
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capital in most capitalist countries. In addition, he warned the 
conference that "other countries were not standing still while the 
Eastern European countries move toward Communiso".1/ These were 
serious admissions for a Communist spokesman to make in light of 
the earlier Soviet appraisal of the Common Market and capitalism. 
The mo·st recent change in Soviet and Eastern European 
tactics toward the Common Market came shortly after the January 14, 
1963 de Gaulle press conference which presaged the breakdown of 
negotiations for the United Kingdom's entry into the EEC. Soviet 
and Eastern European spokesmen saw a resurgence of "contradictions" 
among the monopolies in the advanced capitalist states, a crisis 
brought on by changes in power relations in the West and a re-
·affirmation of the autarkic character of the EEC. The opportunity 
presented by the troubled state of European integration efforts was 
offset by a concern over the Franco-German treaty which was charac-
terized as a war treaty and as a reflection of the new Paris-Bonn 
axis. While the Soviets still defend the old Marxist-Lenin analysis 
of the Common Market, its formulations in the current (since early 
1963) phase allow for flexibility. Thus it includes the familiar 
line of opposition against this institution of monopoly capitalism 
(i.e., "the Europe of trusts") but also leaves room for the Italian 
position which seeks to increase Communist influence within the EEC 
and for the Polish and Yugoslav desire of encouraging trade between 
the two groups of countries.,§/ 
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In recent years, the Eastern European countries have 
generally ·become reconciled to the likely achievement of a customs 
union among the six member countries of the EEC. While at first 
apprehensive over possible negative effects of an EEC common 
commercial policy vis-a-vis the state-trading countries, Eastern 
European officials now appear more confident that the over-all 
trading position of their countries in regard to the EEC group will 
not be seriously affected. However, there is an expectation in 
these countries that the present trade pattern will necessarily 
change, particularly as a result of the EEC's common agricultural 
policy (CAP). Trade officials of the Eastern European countries 
now are looking pragmatically at ways to adjust to expected changes 
in regard to diversification of trade, as needed, and how to 
exploit their bargaining position as a growing market for quality 
exports from the EEC. Among the three Eastern European countries 
visited by this writer, only in Hungary did a foreign trade ~fficial 
allude to possible retaliatory measures against what he considered 
to be the implicit discrimination of the Common Market. 
As of May 1965, however, none of the Eastern European 
countries had recognized the Common Market as a customs union. 
No missions to the EEC had been established by these countries, but 
trade discussions have been held, for example, with Yugoslav and 
with Polish delegations. The latter concluded "technical" negoti-
ations in regard to egg imports into EEC ·countries. It is very 
likely that such contacts will increase in the period ahead. 
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c. CEMA and the Common Market 
The Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), which 
was established in 1949 on the initiative of the Soviet Union in 
answer to the Marshall Plan, attempted little economic coordination 
let alone integration during the Stalin period. At the height of 
the Hungarian revolt in the fall of 1956, the Soviet Union pledged 
itself to respect the sovereignty and equality of all members of 
CEMA. Shortly thereafter, some initial steps were taken in CEMA 
to coordinate national economic plans, but little serious effort 
was attempted in this direction until June 1962 when the Moscow 
Conference of the representative of Communist and Workers Parties 
of CEMA member states approved "Basic Principles of the Inter-
national Division of Labor." The principles, which had been under 
consideration since the end of 1961, focussed on the need for 
specialization among CEMA members. This step reflected Soviet 
and Eastern European reactions both to the threat posed by Britain's 
bid to .enter the Common Market as well as to the growing intensity 
of Sino-Soviet differences. The action of CEMA was followed by a 
reorganization of its structure and an activation of its constitutent 
organs. In addition, some publicity was given to CEMA by prominent 
Communist officials, notably Premier Krushchev.,2/ 
In the ensuing period, CEMA considered the coordination 
of long-term economic planning of member countries with the view 
to encouraging specialization in production, reduction in autarkic 
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tendencies and the establishment of a more rational price policy. 
In late 1962, CEMA decided to establish an international bank to 
help multilateral clearances among member countries. Plans were 
furthered for the establishment of the "Freedom Pipe Line" to 
carry Soviet oil to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. An electric 
power grid was planned among several member countries. Cooperat~ve 
arrangements were also developed in regard to railroad rolling 
stock and communications lines. In addition, the Standing 
Commission of CEMA worked on specialization agreements among 
member countries in different industrial spheres and facilitated 
the exchange of technical assistance. Information has been sparse 
on the operation of these plans and, particularly, how possible 
problems were resolved. Evidence of difficulties, however, have 
been admitted by Eastern European spokesmen and occasionally 
reach the press. For example, the views of a Polish CEMA bank 
official were reported in May of 1965 that CEMA's international 
bank was a failure because the rouble had not been made a convertible 
international currency upon which multilateral clearances among CEMA 
members could be basedl..Q/ 
In July 1963, CEMA's key proposal for coordinating long-
term economic planning of member states ran afoul of nationalist 
and autarkic tendencies primarily of Rumania and to some extent of 
B~lgaria, the lesser developed CEMA countries. Rumania, which had 
resisted CEMA authority since 1961, vigorously objected to the 
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limitations proposed in regard to her industrial development plans. 
A long-term planning proposal was dropped, but provisionally, it 
was agreed that the shorter range (5-year) plans would be kept 
under review. Movement by CEMA toward any significant economic 
integration was arrested at this time. A cautiously worded 
communique of the 19th Session of the CEMA Council, which met 
from January 28 to February 2, 1965, reflected some continued 
economic cooperation. CEMA's Secretary, N. V. Fyeyev, in 
answering questions by journalists made it clear that nothing 
had been done in regard to possible economic integration.11/ 
Failure of CEMA to make any significant progress toward 
economic integration can be attributed to a number of factors:12/ 
(1) nationalist and autarkic tendencies in the various member 
countries, (2) inflexibility of centralized Communist state-planning 
machinery within member countries, (3) vested interest and pressure 
groups at the national plane that would be weakened by integration*, 
(4) overwhelming economic and political powe:-in CEMA of a single 
country, the USSR, (5) absence of a rational price structure, 
*Egon Neuberger points out that agreement on curtailing invest-
ment in an autarkic industry appears much more difficult than 
lowering trade barriers in the West that might have a similar impact. 
He cites the EEC negotiations in the agricultural sphere as being 
particularly difficult since this represents an industry where 
governmental intervention with the free market is greatest. 
(Bibliography, item 11, page 15) 
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(6) lack of effective international financial mechanisms to 
facilitate trade and payments, (7) bars to movement ~f capital 
and-manpower across borders, and (8) the wide disparities in the 
state of economic development among member countries. 
Although it failed to bring about economic integration, 
CEMA was a useful instrument in promoting political unity in the 
Connnunist camp after the 1956 Hungarian and Poznan uprisings until. 
early 1961 when Sino-Soviet differences had a significant impact 
on Eastern European countries. CEMA met the political objectives 
of the Soviet leadership during this period, but not the aspirations 
of the Eastern European countries which also sought economic 
advantages. Economic integration in Eastern Europe, unlike Western 
Europe, would probably first require political integration.* 
From discussions with Eastern European foreign trade 
officials, it did not appear to this writer that CEMA is now providing 
more than a loose international consultative mechanism for member 
countries apparently less significant than the nearest equivalent, 
the OECD, is to the West. Although no open defections from CEMA are 
likely to occur, its recent activities have reflected a diminishing 
interest on the part of member countries which have been sending 
lesser officials to meetings and in some cases have abstained from 
CEMA specialization agreements. Since basic differences of 
*Brzezinski cites Jacob Viner's observation "that it is more 
difficult to integrate centrally-planned socialist economies than 
market economies, without suppression of national identities." 
(See Bibliography item 3, page 402, footnote.) 
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interests among member countries are reflected in the reduced 
attention given to CEMA, it is doubtful whether the organization 
could speak with authority for the Eastern European countries as 
a group in possible relations with the EEC or other Western-
oriented institutions such as GATT. Desirable as the objective 
may be, unless current trends are reversed, it is difficult to 
envisage CEMA carrying out a meaningful role of representing 
Eastern Europe in Europe-wide cooperative efforts along lines 
suggested by Brzezinski • .ld/ 
2. Common Market Policy Toward the Eastern European Countries 
Polycentrism in the Communist camp has been matched by a 
certain degree of nationalism among EEC member countries that has 
slowed progress on a common commercial policy toward the state-
trading countries of Eastern Europe. For somewhat different 
reasons, France and Germany have resisted moves in the EEC toward 
the establishment of such a policy. France apparently wishes to 
retain freedom of action in this sphere as long as possible in 
support of its campaign for rapprochement with Eastern Europe. 
It may also be trying to enlarge its trade activities as much as 
possible in Eastern Europe in order to reach a relatively higher 
base of commercial activity by the time the _transitional period 
ends. The French have shown much interest in developing a market 
for capital equipment in Eastern Europe. German interest is 
centered primarily on the establishment of closer contacts with 
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Eastern European countries in the absence of diplomatic relations 
. , 
due to the inhibitions of_ the Hallstein Doctrine. To an increasing 
degree, Fedrep trading missions have been carrying out normal 
diplomatic functions. As far as can be determined, the interests 
of Italy and the Benelux countries are primarily commercial and 
these c·ountries have not opposed the various Commission proposals 
designed to hasten the development of a common EEC policy. 
Because of the forementioned divisions, only minimal steps 
have been taken by the EEC towar? coordinating commercial policy 
vis-a-vis the state-trading countries. Reliance continues to be 
placed on bilateral trade agreements with the exception of certain 
agricultural products, presently eggs and poultry, which are subject 
to the EEC's common agricultural policy (CAP). So far, no member 
state has included the "EEC clause" in any bilateral agreement 
with a state-trading country although a Council decision of July 20, 
1960 called for such a provision which w::,uld envisage the competence 
of Common Market organs with the establishment of a common com-
mercial policy.14/ 
A decision of the EEC's Council on October 9, 1961 established 
a procedure for consultation in regard to bilateral trade negotiations 
between member and state-trading countries. Bilateral agreements 
could not go beyond the transitional period and only annual agree-
ments were permitted unless an EEC clause or a 12-month cancellation 
provision was included. A further step was taken in September 1962 
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when EEC and country experts were called upon by the Commission 
to work toward a comm.on policy on quota restrictions practiced 
in this sphere. However, this work was later suspended in the 
absence of progress toward an agreed policy within the Community. 
On January 24, 1963, the Council issued regulations on imports 
from state-trading countries of agricultural products subject to the 
authbrity of the EEC (i.e., grains, pork, eggs and poultry). 
While these regulations abolished quantitative restrictions on the 
agricultural products, covered, so-called "value quotas" -- in 
effect, a limit of 20 percent above the average 1960-61 levels of 
imports -- were not to be exceeded. This arrangement, which was 
due to lapse in December 1964, was extended another year." A subse-
quent effort in April 1965 to have the Council of Ministers consider 
Commission proposals on quota restrictions and credit policy toward 
state-trading countries failed when the French representative 
insisted the latter was a "political" matter which could only be 
decided in the national capitals. However, the discouraged Eurocrats 
apparently did not consider the situation hopeless, according to an 
Economist report of this development • .12./ Mention was made in this 
item of the possible use of leverage by the Commission that may be 
provided by agricultural subsidy payments, which begin in 1967, 
to bring recalcitrant EEC countries into line on commercial policy 
vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. 
. . . 
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The Commission has complained that due to the low degree of 
harmonization of commercial policy achieved, increasing recourse 
has been made to Article llSkof the Rome Treaty. By January 1964, 
159 complaints had been submitted in regard to various Eastern 
European imports which had been re-exported to other member 
countries. (The products covered such economic sectors as consumer 
items, chemical products, me~als and automobiles.)16/ 
The Commission plans, of course, to continue to encourage 
the elimination of quota restrictions in trade with the Eastern 
European countries and to work toward the transformation of the 
present bilateral agreements into Community agreements by the end 
of the transitional period. However, the immediate outlook for 
progress toward a comm.on commercial policy is not bright. Bilateral 
trade agreements with Eastern European countries, discussed below, 
are generally looked upon by EEC countries as a means of assuring 
certain exports. Unless moves are made toward multilateral East-
West trade arrangements within the broader GATT context, it seems 
likely that the Common Market will retain the familiar bilateral 
pattern on a Comm.unity-wide instead of country basis. Conceivably, 
such EEC trade agreements might take on the characteristics of 
"Conventions of Association" employed in some cases by the Common 
*Under provisions of Article 115, member countries can 
obtain compensation in cases of market disruption due to price 
disparities of imports originating in third countries. 
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Market to provide for a gradual adjustment of certain.countries 
to changes in established trading patterns that will result from 
the creation of the customs union. (For example, such Conventions 
have been negotiated with Greece, Turkey, Austria, Israel, etc.) 
The term itself would, of course, be unacceptable at this time 
to Eastern European countries, but the objective of providing for 
a gradual accommodation to multilateral trading arrangements might 
be included in possible EEC bilateral agreements with Eastern 
European countries. Provisions might, as in the case of the 
Conventions, vary in accordance with the trade patterns and the 
related state of economic development of each of the countries. 
B. Trade Between Eastern European and EEC Countries 
1. Levels, Composition and Relative Importance 
Available trade data* show that Eastern Europe's commerce 
with the Common Market countries is not large in volume, repre-
senting about two percent of the latters' total foreign trade in 
recent years. For the Eastern Eu!'Opean countries, however, this 
trade is considerably more significant at about ten percent of' 
their total foreign commerce • .lZ/ The average ratio of about 
*A statistical caveat is advisable when using East-West trade 
statistics for more than a general indication of trends. The 
estimates, quoted below, in regard to Eastern Europe exclude the 
Soviet Union, trade between the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Fed-
rep and the trade of Yugoslavia. Marked shifts can occur from year 
to year because of the institutional structure of trade in East 
Europe (discussed below) and because of uncertain variations in 
the agricultural sphere which is an important component of this 
trade. In addition, changes in availability of credit can have 
a significant effect on annual rates of trade. 
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5 to 1 in the relative importance of mutual trade is higher for 
the less developed Eastern European countries such as Rum.ania 
and Hungary than for Czechoslovakia, Poland a~d Eastern Germgny. 
In 1963, imports from Eastern European into Co:nmon Market countries 
a;nounted to $784.8 million; w~ile exports from the latter to 
Eastern Europe totaled $711.6 milli~n.J.li/ 
Although Eastern European trade with Common Market countries 
increased in the past few years, except for Rumania it tended to 
follow the general upward .:novement in levels of overall foreign 
trade for both groups of count~ies. Thus, in the regiongl 
distrib~tion of trade, intra-cEM.., trade has remained at about 70 
percent with Soviet trade apparently beco.:ning somewhat more 
important.within the Com,~unist group.1.2./ 
Intra-CEM..\ trade has, of course, been mu-::h more significant 
to the small Eastern European countries than to the huge and 
practically self-sufficient Soviet Union. Tnis trade, nevertheless, 
is of great significance ta the Soviets who have used Eastern Europ·= 
as a workshop to pro~ess their basic materials into machinery, trans-
p-:>rt equipment and certain consu.:ners' goods for use in the USSR and 
in the developing countries. Trade with E3stern European countries 
has undoubtedly released key Soviet resources to concentrate on 
high priority heav1 industry, precision equipment, rockets and 
ultra-modern weapons. Were it not for Eastern European trade, the 
Soviets would have probably been obliged to reduce some of their 
world power activities, including their dramatic sp.:1ce exploits.l.Q./ 
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EEC countries account for about 50 percent of West~rn 
European trade with the Eastern European countries, with the 
Fedrep representing about 50 percent of the Common Market's share. 
Exports from Eastern European to Common Market countries tend to 
be relatively heavy in agricultural products (over one-third); 
industrial products make up less than one-third and raw materials and 
fuels the remainder of roughly one-third. About 80 percent of 
total imports into Eastern Europe from the Common Market countries 
represent industrial products with the remainder in the agricultural 
and raw materials categories.21/ A further examination of the 
im?ortant category, industrial products, would reveal significant 
proportions in quality machinery and capital equipment imports from 
EEC into Eastern European countries. A Czech official explained to 
this writer that the need to broaden his country's trade (i.e., to 
the West) reflects a change from requirements of the early post-war 
growth period in basic industries to the present need to modernize 
technology throughout the economy. It should be noted that the 
composition of the important agricultural component of Eastern 
European exports, of course, is largely in the usual temperate 
zone products that are likely to be increasingly affected by the 
CAP which would tend to make the EEC self-sufficient in these 
agricultural products. 
2. Factors Affecting Trade Between the Two Groups 
a. Institutional Framework22/ 
The general structure of East-West trade, of course, has 
,. 
I 
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a major bearing on the evolving trade relations between the Eastern 
European and EEC countries. Except for Yugoslavia, foreign trade 
is a monopoly of the Foreign Trade Corporations in the various 
Eastern European countries. The Foreign Trade Corporations are 
generally responsible for both imports and exports in broad 
production and servicing categories (e.g., metallurgical products, 
textiles and clothing, machinery, chemicals, agricultural products, 
transport facilities, etc.). Foreign trade is an integral part of 
central planning in these countries and overall targets are included 
in the plan for trade in the two categories, "socialist countries" 
and "capitalist countries", respectively. The process of planning 
involves low~r echelon enterprises which submit draft plans, 
including foreign trade elements, to the State Planning Commission. 
The import plan is the essential part of foreign trade planning 
with exports looked upon primarily as a source for needed foreign 
exchange. 
In carrying out the foreign trade aspects of the plan 
affecting individual enterprises, the Ministries of Foreign Trade 
guide the appropriate Foreign Trade Corporation. The State Bank, 
in turn, generally has been charged with licensing the use of 
foreign exchange for given transactions and is usually the reposi-
tory of foreign exchange receipts. The pattern of setting prices 
under the state planning procedure and the absence of currency 
convertibility, of course, also have a significant impact on trade 
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Although central planning systems in Eastern Europe 
are geared primarily to quantitative decisions, presumably based 
on some indicaticn of relative efficiency, the absence of an 
objective cost and related price structure results inevitably in 
arbitrary decisions affecting the domestic economy as well as 
foreign trade. ·There is often little relation between the internal 
and ~xternal prices of Eastern European countries. This stems both 
from the weaknesses of the internal price system as well as the 
artifical exchange rates. Nove's comments on the Soviet Union 
have much relevance when he notes that were prices related to 
those of the West under any exchange rate and trade based on 
profitability and comparative costs, a basic revision in foreign 
trade plans would result. Complicated internal accounting systems 
attempt to adjust profit and loss inconsistencies due to differ-
ences between the international and domestic Eastern European 
prices and to the artifical exchange rates.24/ 
In recent years, there has, of course, been an increasing 
awareness of the price problem in Eastern European countries, 
including the Soviet Union. Some economic reforms currently 
being introduced in Czechoslovakia are directed largely at this 
problem and are being closely watched by other Eastern European 
countries. Foreign trade is also expected to benefit, but the 
principal objective claimed for the Czech reforms is to improve 
the efficiency of the overall economy by introducing some market 
' ·.· 
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factors in establishing prices at the consumer and intermediary 
levels.* Prices for major capital equipment and raw materials 
will continue to be fixed by the Central Planning Commission. 
Apparently, differences among Czech officials developed over the 
reforms and, according to one official, some of those who were 
concerned with foreign trade favored more radical changes. 
In addition to reforms in price setting, foreign trade 
incentives have been provided in Czechoslovakia to individual 
enterprises which can retain certain foreign exchange earnings 
for use in the purchase of needed imported equipment or in 
enabling officials to travel abroad. The latter incentive 
apparently is important to Czechs who are anxious to renew 
traditional contacts in Western Europe. In addition, a few 
large firms can now engage directly in foreign trade activities 
without going through the Foreign Trade Corporations. 
Trade officials in both Hungary and Rumania have been 
watching Czech reforms closely. To a·more limited extent, incentives 
*The introduction of some market factors in regard to consumers' 
prices in certain Eastern European countries has received much 
attention in the West since it runs counter to basic tenets of the 
rigid central planning system. According to one close observer of 
Eastern Europe, ECE's Stein Rossen, the market-oriented reforms have 
been modest when compared with recent improvements in efficiency 
criteria employed by the central planners. He believes that the 
impact, for example, of Polish economist Tzerciokowski's refinements 
in econometric models used in optimization analysis is relatively 
more important, particularly when teamed with an increasing use of 
computers. The type of reforms employed would, of course, have an 
important effect on the nature of evolving economic institutions in 
Eastern Europe. In either case, if a more rational price system 
ensues, it would facilitate foreign trade. 
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have also been extended to Hungarian enterprises to increase 
foreign trade activities. Hungarian foreign trade officials have 
recently been promoting a so-called "division of labor" with 
enterprises in market economy countries. Essentially, the scheme 
calls for licensing and marketing arrangements between Hungarian 
and Western enterprises. Several such schemes have been under 
negotiation with large enterprises in Austria and Western Germany. 
However, none of significance had been completed up to early May 
1965 by the Hungarian authorities who apparently are exercising 
considerable caution before embarking on new directions. This 
type of arrangement, one Hungarian official remarked, would be 
particularly attractive to firms in those Western European 
countries experiencing labor shortages. The arrangement would be 
particularly helpful to Hungary in accelerating the adaptation of 
new technology without the need for prior costly research. 
Trade officials in the various Eastern Euro!l!an countries 
apparently are increasingly adjusting practices to requirements of 
trading with Western countries. In Czechoslovakia, officials of 
two large Foreign Trade Corporations (Metalimex, which deals with 
metal ores and coke; and Koospol, which handles agricultural 
products) explained to this writer how they supplement their 
technical staffs with well-qualified experts from individual 
enterprises as needed in trade negotiations. Resort to market 
research, advertising, packaging, etc. was mentioned in regard 
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to food products destined for Western consumers. A Rumanian 
foreign trade official concerned with "market research" applied 
this term broadly to the analysis of economic trends in Western 
countries that is used in guiding over-all trade policy and 
plans. In all three countries, the foreign trade officials seemed 
to be looking for practical solutions. Mention of the possible 
impact of the Common Market on patterns of trade with Eastern 
Europe was generally met by an assurance thatalternatives were 
actively being examined. 
In none of three Eastern European countries visited by 
the writer did officials look upon Yugoslavia as a possible model 
for Eastern European reforms in the economic and trade spheres. 
One prominent Czech economist, who played a major role in developing 
the reforms in his country, expressed the view that the Yugoslav 
system takes too much authority away from the central planners in 
regard to investment. Re attributed recent inflationary problems 
in Yugoslavia to what he characterized as this basic defect of the 
Yugoslav system. Part of these inflationary pressures, h~ explained, 
also came from individual enterprises competing in regard to foreign 
trade. In addition, he cautioned that Yugoslavia is dealing with 
the special problems of a less developed country that are not 
relevant to his country. 
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c. Role of Other International Institutions: GATT, OECD, etc. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, in a 
broader economic sphere, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) or other international organizations might 
provide channels for helping to normalize economic relations 
between the Eastern European and EEC as well as other Western 
countries. The EEC Commission has alluded to the importance of 
the current Kennedy Round of tariff reduction negotiations in GATT 
in regard to future trade possibilities for Eastern European 
countries·with the Community. Although not playing a direct role 
in the trade sphere, the OECD could conceivably serve indirectly 
to facilitate trade c6ntacts as well as to provide a useful channel 
for economic consultation and possible technical assistance. 
Czechoslovakia alone among the Eastern European countries is 
a contracting party of GATT. However, this status has mainly been 
a formality since the country passed into the Communist camp in 
1948. Most contracting parties do not apply GATT rules to 
~ 
Ciechoslovakia:iexports which ha't been subjected to quota restrictions 
as have those of other Eastern European countries. Bilateral agree-
ments tend to be the pattern for trade between the market economy 
and the centrally planned countries of Eastern Europe. Restrictions 
are often placed on the convertibility of currency earnings by the 
Eastern European countries in these trade agreements, although the 
trend has been to~ard full convertibility of foreign exchange 
earnings in recent years.1,j_/ 
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Yugoslavia and Poland had at first become associated with 
GATr and more recently have acquired the status of "provisional 
members." All three of the forementioned Eastern European countries 
are participating in the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations in 
GATT. Rumania has reportedly made some inquiries regarding possible 
association with GATT. Some of the Eastern European countries are 
experimenting with tariffs for· use primarily as a bargaining device 
in trade negotiations. A Hungarian official described to this 
writer a two-tier tariff system his country has established that 
will be employed in negotiations for MFN status with Western 
countries and im?licitly to co~nter what he considers tariff 
discrimination by the EEC. 
Some major problems for the GATT mechanism in regard to possible 
multilateral trading relations with Eastern European countries relate 
to the assurance of effective reciprocity and of access to markets. 
Tariffs would not appear to most observers as the principal mechanism 
that could be used by state-traders either to control access to 
markets or to discriminate among sellers. Both the Czechs and Poles 
have made proposals for ex post facto examinations in GATT of their 
trade policy as a way of meeting these concerns. In the current 
Kennedy Round, mention has been made of offers from these countries 
to assure a given percentage increase in trade with GATT contracting 
parties over a fixed period of time. Progress might be examined 
through an annual review procedure within GATT. 
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Probably a more difficult problem is posed for Eastern 
European countries in the GATT framework by those Western countries 
which prefer the type of trade assurances provided by bilateral 
trade.agreements contrasted with the seemingly greater uncertain-
ties of multilateral trade with state-trading countries. In GATT 
circles, this view has been conveyed by a few of the larger·Western 
European countries wbich bargain for their exports when seeking a· 
balance in trade while negotiating trade agreements. A similar 
attitude to possible multilateralization of Eastern European trade 
seemed to be evident to this writer in EEC circles in Brussels. 
In any event, the develop.nents in the current Kennedy Round s~ould 
be of considerable importance in regard to future relations of 
Eastern European countries with GATT -- an institution which 
admittedly has been geared closely to the trade needs of the 
industrially advanced Western market economy countries. 
In the inteteat of facilitating entry of Eastern European 
countries into G~TT negotiations, one Brussels Eurocrat spoke to 
the writer of a possible "Special Chapter" in GATT for problems 
of the state-trading countries, pointing to the analogous approach 
undertaken for the developing co~ntries. Ti1is idea, he hurriedly 
went on to note, would probably be opposed by many GA.TT m2m1.:>ers, 
including the United States. Such an approach, of course, runs 
the risk of perpetuating the current bilateral trading arrangeme~ts 
between Eastern and Western European countries. Preferably, a 
. 
' ' 
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differentiation between the advanced and less developed Eastern 
European countries could be considered within GATT. Some help 
to the less developed countries could be provided by not requiring 
full reciprocity along the lines now applied to Yugoslavia. To the 
extent possible, use should be made of the educational value of 
obliging the advanced Eastern European countries to qualify for 
MFN treatment under GATT rules.26/ 
The OECD* offers a possible channel for closer economic 
relations between the Eastern European and particularly the 
Western European countries. Since 1955, Yugoslavia was invited 
as an observer to attend certain meetings of OECD's predecessor, 
the Organization of Europ::an Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Ithas 
participated fully in the OEEC's (and now OECD's) work in agri-
culture, productivity and scientific and technical personnel. 
Since 1961, Yugoslavia has also participated fully in the work of 
Economic and Development Review Coni~ittee which carries out the 
OECD's ann'..lal review of the economic situation and prospects in 
member countries. It should be noted that since 1962 Yugoslavia 
has also been sending observers to meetings of CID~~. 
Discussions with the OECD Secretariat and the Yugoslav delegation 
leave the writer with the impression that the organization's 
*In addition to Western European countries, United States, 
Canada and Japan are mem~ers of the OECD. Yugoalavia, as noted 
above, and Finland are associated in some aspects of OECD 
activities. 
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activities have been useful in facilitating contacts for the 
Yugoslavs with the West, in obtaining technical assistance and 
advice on various problems, and in providing some insight into 
economic developments in member countries that might affect trade 
opportunities in the West. Apparently, other Eastern European 
countries have not made any direct overtures to the OECD, although 
mention has been made in OECD circles of some signs of interest 
on the part of the Czechs in the organization's activities. There 
is, of course, the political problem of overcoming the history of 
the 1948 Marshall Plan preparatory conference which preceded the 
establishment of the OECD's predecessor, the OEEC. At that time, 
the Czechs left the conference with some reluctance on orders from 
Moscow. Looking at the types of advantages found by tre Yugoslavs, 
it seems that the OECD could provide a possible consultative channel 
through various aspects of the organization's activities as the 
trend continues toward a normalization of relations ~etween the 
Eastern and Western European countries. 
Alternatively, such a possible role for the UN's Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) may be hampered by its Cold War history 
as a forum for East-West propaganda skirmishes. Although the 
quality of ECE Secretariat work has been excellent, the regular 
activities of its constitutent elements do not appear to provide 
the practical advantages of the OECD; 
' , . 
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On balance, GATT would seem to be the most promising inter-
national channel for further contact at this time between the 
Eastern European and Western countries in the trade sphere, but 
it would not be suitable for broader economic consultation and 
cooperation. Between the two organizations operating in the 
broad European economic sphere, the OECD seems to have some 
advantages over the ECE. At a later stage, probably after the 
two key European elections of i9o5 are over and the outcome of 
the Kennedy Round is in sight, it would be useful to give serious 
thought to international institutional arrangements which could 
foster constructive contacts between Eastern and Western Europe. 
Perhaps some type of ad hoe consultative mechanism could be 
developed by the OECD or a completely independent structure for 
this purpose might be considered. 
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Chapter IV 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Polycentrism and renewed nationalistic trends in Eastern 
Europe have been reflected in a strong desire to normalize 
relations with Western Europe and particularly with Common Market 
countries where traditional ties have been closest. In recent 
years, the Eastern European countries have been trying to approa::h 
trade and other contacts with the EEC countries in a pragmatic 
way, relatively devoid of the ideological content which was 
common until 1962. 
Recent economic reforms and related changes have not resulted 
in any apparent wea~ening of the Communist regimes in the Eastern 
Europe. On balan::e, the nationalist trends accompanied by humanizing 
and liberalizing tenden::ies have probably provided a greater degree 
of popular support for these govern~ents than heretofore. In-
creased trade and other contacts with the West will probably stimulate 
pressures for further reforms within Eastern Europe. This process 
progressively could lead to further modernization, greater consumer 
orientation of the Eastern European economies, a relatively greater 
economic interdependence with the West and, concomitantly, to a 
normalization of international relations. 
The e.conomic expansion of Common Market countries, whether 
atttibuted to economic integration or not, has disturbed Conununist 
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spokesmen in their efforts to explain contemporary capitalism. 
The record of the EEC hardly reflects Marxist-Leninist writ on 
the decadence of capitalism and the pauperization of the pro-
leteriat. Eastern theorists have pointed to the expanded market 
as an important factor behind the favorable economic trends in 
the EEC countries. There has been some continuing criticism of 
alleged monopolistic forces in the EEC that are contrary to the 
provisions of the Rome Treaty. Occasional sla:::kening of economic 
activity in EEC countries has been magnified by CoIIL~unist observers. 
However, the Soviet and Eastern European spokesmen have increasingly 
been ~oderating their former doctrinal assertions on the Common 
Market by introducing some factual data anddescriptive analysis 
into current discussions. 
Wnile accepting the reality of the Common Market, the Eastern 
I 
European regimes are not enthusiastic about the institution. No 
Eastern European country has extended legal recognition to the 
Commu::iity or established a mission in Brussels to deal with its 
constituent elements. However, the Eastern European countries have 
been moving ca·.1tiously toward de fa:::to or "technical" relations 
with the EEC. (e.g., Negotiations between Poland and the Commission 
regarding import prices for eggs, which were concluded in April 
1965, were characterized as "technical".) 
Trade between the Eastern European and EEC countries tends 
to follow the pattern of relations between developing and industrially 
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advanced countries. Exports froc0. the Eastern European collntries 
concentrate on agricultural produ:::ts, primary com:nodities and 
semi-manufactured goods. Eastern European imports from the KriC 
area consist to a consideraole d,:gree of macbinery, chemicals, 
transport an:l other equip.nent. In l:D th size and content, this 
trade is relatively m0re important to the Ea.stern Eu::opean 
,:oun::ries thaa to the m-=mb~r co;.mtries of the EEC. Such trade 
represents about 2 percent of the total foreign trade of the 
CoiillD.on Market area :i.nd is not of high priority content, b:.it about 
10 percent of the total trade of the Eastern Eu:-:opean ::01Jntries is 
involved with heavy e:n?lnsis on mu:::h needed quality im:,orts. 
The Coilllnon ~arket can '.)e a vital element in the 2volutioa 0£ 
liberalizing trends in Eastern E~rope. As a complementary econoillic 
unit, it wo·LJ.ld normally be the most attractive Western tra:iing unit 
for the Eastern Euro,Jeari. countries. It is the com,.11011 interest of 
the non-Coi.Ihn~nlst world that this relationship oe encouraged in a 
fashion which would sustain liberalizing treads in the Eastern 
Europea.:1. countries. Tn,-= 'EEC, were it gra:lually to m0ve away from 
'Jilateral to multilateral tra:iing patterns, could stim11late further 
reforms in the trading structure,; of Eastern Europe. Progress in 
this resp,ect also dep,mds on the outcome of the Ken~edy Rou:1d tariff 
negotiations in GArc in which Czecho.;lovakia, Poland and Yu5oslav-ia 
are participating. An outward-looking EEC trade policy, including 
the imp,::>rtant a 5ricultural spher::?, wo1lld do m·.1ch fo foster clo.;e 
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cooperative relatio.1.s. Alternatively, a narcow protectio~ist 
trading p·:>licy could lead to retaliato·ry efforts on :he ?art, of 
the &astern Ec1ropean countriea with a p:>ssible strengthening of 
relations with the. S:niet Union. 
It would be unrealistic to ,exp•.?ct rapid or fundamental change.:; 
in the internal economic stru:ture and institution3 of Eastern 
Europa.an coantries to result fro:.n current tren:.is in traie with E~C 
and other W<.?stern countries. Howev,ar, further reforms ~dll probably 
be made in the foreign trade. structure of Eastera. Europ·e in ord,er 
to ia,:ilitate new tra:ie OP?:>rtunities. Th,e Foreign Tra:ie :::!orp,'.>-
rations which now have a monopoly in foreign trade within Eastern 
Europ·aa.1. ::m.mtries (ex,;ept for Yugoslavia) will prooably give some 
ground to direct foreign tra:ie. relations by hrge enterprises. 
Increasingly, special in::entives are being p:co·;rided to the. latter 
to e:,cpand their foreign traie with the West. Upgrading of Eastern 
European personn,e.1 recruited for work in foreign trade appears to 
be going on as a result of tra:ie efforts directed westwards. 
Imp-orta..1.t reforUL'> in pricing, undertak~n in Czechoslovakia in the 
interest of increasing the afficienc.y of the overall ecoa'Jmy as 
well as to meet req·;iirem,ents of foreign traia, are being watch:d 
closely by other Eastern 'European countries. In aidi tioa., licensing 
a:1.d marketing arrangements with Western Europea.J. Hrms .3.re under 
active coi.1.sideration in Eastera. Europe, particularly in S:.mgary. 
Tha resulting direct contacts between Western E:.iropean .na.:i.13eme.nt 
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and technical personnel and those of Eastern European enterprises 
could be influential in the general industrial scene. 
In regard to specific EEC trade relations problems, the 
Eastern Europ'.!an countries appear to s~,are the s.:1.me concern as 
the United States over possible protectionist trade policies, 
particularly in the agricultural sphere. However, continued 
reliance on bilateral trade agreements could tend to make the 
im~act of the CAP on Eastern E~ropean trade less marked than on 
multilateral trade in regard to the products in question. In an 
effort to maintain export lev2ls envisaged un~er bilateral 
agreements, the EEC might in effect provide preferential treatment 
through assured quotas to E3.stern European countries. 
The risks of disintegration and Balkanization in Eastern 
Europe while integration mt)ves ahead in Western Europe have, 
with m~ch conviction, been cited by Brzezinski and Moatias. This. 
is a high priority concern which should warrant careful joint 
examination ~y the United States ani the W2stern European countries. 
It is hoped that, in the not too distant future, the Com.non M9.rket 
countries would be in the position to decide on a com.:non foreign 
policy responsive to this b.9.sic concern. Such a step seems to be 
essential before a meaningful comnon commercial policy toward the 
Eastern European countries can be developed. Various international 
institutions could facilitate a constructive evolution in relations 
between the Eastern and Western European countries. GA.TT, initially 
.. 
- !+7 
on. trade matters, ani subs~quently, in a broader sphere, th-= OECD 
oc some altern:1tive mecha:tl.sm could provide needed chan:i.els for 
consu~tation and possibly association in regard to corn.~on ecorromic 
concerns of all European ,:ountries. 
On the basis of these conclusions and in the light of broad 
United States policy o·oj actives in Euro?•=, the follo· .. ing proposals 
are set forth as sa3gested policy guida.1.::e fo:c the fin-11 fe-,1 
years remaining in ~he EEC' s tran.3i tional period: 
1. A 11ormalization of rehtion.s .9.way from the C,,ld Wir 
pattern should be sough~ as an i~nediate obje=tiva 
in traie a.1:i other contacts between the EEC ani 
Eastern E:.iropean :o-untries. 
2. Expansion of tra:ie O??·:,rtunities for Eastern E:.iro?aan 
countries in EEC aad o;:her Westen1 E·.1ropaan countries 
should be enco,iraged so as to re::l.u,::e progressively tha 
degre,e of relian:;e on trade with the Soviet Uaion. 
3. 'Preferably, trade relations between ·::he tw.:> groups of 
countries should 'je en=oura6ed to mo·ve toward a .nulti• 
lateral basis from the vces~nt pattern of bilate~al 
agreements au:i quota. restrictions with the view to 
facilitating trade expa~siou and the liberalizatioa 
of tra:ie and related econ:>:anic institutio.1s within 
Eastern Europe. 
- 48. -
4~ Sympathetic co~sideration should be givan to Eastern 
Btiropean offers in the current IC.enn,?dy Rou:id of tariff 
negotiations in GATJ:. Experimentally, an annual review 
technique or other device might be employed to ex~mine 
trade policies of Eastern Earopean ~o:.intries for 
c~~pliance with GArr principles. Ultimate accession 
of these coun~ries to GAT'r should be encouraged, if 
the foregoing is saccessful. 
5. E~stern Earop·?an co·,mtries sb.ould b'= encouraged to 
recognize the Colllluon Mark~t and establish missions 
to the EKC in ~russels. 
6. The United States should support possible Eastern 
European efforts to enlarge trade O??Ortunities with 
with the EEC~ particularly wh'=n these efforts would lead 
to multilateral trading arrttn3ements. 
1. In its efforts !:o encourage the EEC to open its do·.:>rs 
to E3stern European countries and to develop an outward-
looking trade policy, the United States should stress 
the potential import3ace of the Common Market in 
reducing divisive tendencies among Eastern European 
countries th!lt could n,?gatively affect the stability 
of all of Europe. 
8. The United Sta::es sho·..ild dis=ourage the ~C from 
developing trade policies toward the E~stern Eu:.opean 
·, 
• 
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countries which could result in retaliation through 
CEM.\ or otherwise strengthen 7Jonds ,,.;rith the S,:>Viet 
Union. 
9. In addition to GAI'r, cited a;,ova, e~dstin3 orga:i.izations 
for b.:-oader econom.:..c cons,.1ltation should be tried or, 
if necessary, new oues developed in order to facilita::e 
further co~tacts betwe2n E~3tern and Western European 
countries. (The OECD, the L'fi1 and the I8RU :ire sugg~s ::ed 
as possibilities. Poasibly a special liaison group ai 
the 02CD might review consultative machinery with 
r~presentativzs of Eastern E~rop2.an countries.) 
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